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The Achilles’ heel of positivism 
The 20th century encompasses philosophical trends as wide apart as  
(neo-) positivism and postmodernism. The assumed objectivity and 
neutrality of the former and the radical relativity claimed by the latter both 
have difficulties in accounting for the nature of universality. Since sense 
experience is directed towards concrete entities and events, the universal 
scope of law-statements remains problematic – particularly exemplified in 
the universal scope of modal terms (what will be designated as modal 
universality). Not even postmodernism can side-step this fundamental ontic 
dimension of reality. Insofar as the positivistic ideal of an objective and 
neutral science still dominates the thought-world of many practising 
(natural and social) scientists, a critique of the Achilles’ heel of positivism 
may render a service to the ideal of Christian scholarship, since it is argued 
that such a critique highlights the inevitability of a distinct theoretical view of 
reality which ultimately emanates from a person’s deepest convictions. The 
contributions of Popper and Stegmüller are contextualized in the argument-
ation. Popper realized that rationality needs a more-than-rational found-
ation and Stegmüller acknowledges that one cannot justify something 
without a prior trust. The inability of sense experience to account for the 
functional properties of natural things and their accompanying concepts 
indeed reveals the Achilles’ heel of positivism. This view is explained 
with reference to the uniqueness of function concepts employed in the 
historical development of the concept of matter. In the final part of the 
article Popper’s idea of falsification is assessed by taking into account the  
                                           
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at an International Popper (Centenary) 
Conference held in Chile (November 2002): Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, 
Facultad de Filosofía y Educación, Instituto de Filosofía. I want to thank anonymous 
referees for valuable suggestions regarding the focus, streamlining the flow of the 
argumentation and the economy of thought incorporated in the final form of this 
article. 
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criticism raised by Stegmüller. In the course of the argumentation the 
relevance for the South African context is mentioned with reference to the 
idea of neutrality as it is advanced in the current debate about the 
teaching of religion at school. 
Opsomming 
Die Achilleshiel van die positivisme 
Die 20ste eeu omvat wysgerige strominge so ver van mekaar verwyderd 
soos die (neo-) positivisme en die postmodernisme. Die veronderstelde 
objektiwiteit en neutraliteit van eersgenoemde en die radikale relatiwiteit 
waarop laasgenoemde aanspraak maak, loop albei in probleme vas 
wanneer rekenskap gegee moet word van die aard van universaliteit. 
Aangesien sintuiglike ervaring altyd gerig is op konkrete dinge en gebeur-
tenisse, kan dit nie werklik rekenskap gee van die status van die for-
mulering van (natuur-)wette nie – veral nie soos wat laasgenoemde weer-
spiëel word in die universele reikwydte van modale terme nie (wat 
aangedui sal word as modale universaliteit). Nie eers die postmodernisme 
kan hierdie fundamentele dimensie van die werklikheid omseil nie. 
Insoverre die positivistiese ideaal van ’n objektiewe en neutrale wetenskap 
nog steeds die gedagtewêreld van praktiserende (natuur- en geestes-) 
wetenskaplikes domineer, sal kritiek op die Achilleshiel van die positivisme 
’n diens lewer aan die ideaal van Christelike wetenskapsbeoefening, aan-
gesien betoog word dat dit die onvermydelikheid van ’n teoretiese werk-
likheidsvisie belig wat uiteindelik in die greep van die diepste oortuiginge 
van die wetenskaplike denker is. Die bydraes van Popper en Stegmüller 
word gekontekstualiseer in die ontvouende argumentasie. Popper het 
besef dat rasionaliteit ’n meer-as-logiese fundering benodig, terwyl 
Stegmüller erken dat niks geregverdig kan word sonder ’n voorafgegewe 
vertroue nie. Die onmoontlikheid om met behulp van sintuiglike ervaring 
rekenskap te gee van die funksionele eienskappe van natuurdinge en die 
daarmee gepaardgaande begrippe, onthul die Achilleshiel van die 
positivisme. Hierdie gesigspunt word verduidelik met verwysing na die 
uniekheid van die funksiebegrippe wat benut is in die ontwikkeling van die 
begrip materie. In die laaste gedeelte van die artikel word Popper se idee 
van valsifikasie beoordeel deur die kritiek van Stegmüller in ag te neem. In 
die loop van die argumentasie word die relevansie vir die Suid-Afrikaanse 
konteks vermeld met verwysing na die idee van neutraliteit wat ’n rol speel 
in die huidige debat oor godsdiensonderrig op skool. 
1. Introduction 
Amidst the emergence and continuation of diverse philosophical trends 
of thought at the end of the 19th and during the first decades of the 20th 
century, the positivist school acquired an exceptional grip on the minds – 
particularly of the special scientists, i.e. those working in die various 
natural sciences. The general idea that only an objective and neutral 
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endeavour, based upon sense experience, is worth obtaining the label 
scientific, not only constitutes the core conviction of the positivist legacy, 
but also permeates other orientations. Across the board scholarly re-
flection throughout the 20th century evinced a serious respect for “facts.” 
Surely, this legacy did not continue to reign unchallenged. During the 
sixties neo-Marxism managed to infiltrate the mindscape of young 
intellectuals – both in Europe and the US – an in doing that it played a 
decisive role in the revolutionary events of the late sixties (the student 
revolts). In France students in Paris advanced with banners claiming that 
the idea of an objective and neutral science is suspect. Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Habermas emphasized that social theory by definition 
entails social critique – if one cannot envisage society to be different from 
what it is, the researcher is enslaved merely to follow its footsteps 
uncritically. During the sixties the controversy between “neopositivism” 
and its more sophisticated successor, “critical rationalism” (Popper and 
his followers), dominated the scene on the one hand, in opposition to the 
Frankfurt school of critical theory on the other hand. The 1970s wit-
nessed the discussion between Luhman and Habermas concerning 
sociology as a “social technology or as a critical theory of society” 
(Münch, 1990:441). Yet, according to Münch, the 1980s pursued a 
different goal: 
... constructing a theory of society and explaining and understanding the 
basic structures, roots and developments of modern societies. ... The 
great classics who contributed to a global perspective on modern 
society have been rediscovered, particularly Weber, Durkheim, and 
Parsons. They are used as more or less stable building blocks for a 
theory of society and an understanding of modernity (Münch, 1990: 
442). 
According to Münch the starting-point of the theoretical debate of the 
1980s is  
Weber’s theory of rationalization of modern society into spheres that are 
guided to an increasing extent by their own inner laws. This theory of 
rationalization has been combined – by Schluchter and Habermas – 
with the theory of functional differentiation as it was formulated by 
Luhmann (Münch, 1990:442). 
By this time (the 1980s) the “linguistic turn” redirected the entire 20th 
century towards a move away from logical purity to linguistic ambiguity 
and an awareness of the relativity of interpretations. This linguistic term 
started to open up a new space for those who preferred to speak about 
postmodernity. This new catchword partially explored basic tenets of 
historicism – an emphasis on the historical situatedness and the relativity 
of human knowledge and human society – compare the introduction of 
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the sociological subdiscipline “sociology of knowledge” (initially by 
Mannheim and later on radicalized by Bloor and his followers from the 
Edinburgh school). 
The hermeneutical tradition, strongly influenced by Heidegger and further 
explored by Gadamer, intended to transcend the impasse of historicism. 
Gadamer once remarked that Heidegger did not again want to introduce 
something essential or divine with his notion of Sein (Being), since he 
aimed much more at something that would – like an event – open the 
space in which hermeneutics could become (without any final foundation) 
a new universal (zum neuen Universale wird). This space is the 
dimension of language (dieser Raum ist die Dimension der Sprache – 
Gadamer, 1989:172). Within the hermeneutical approach tradition as 
such is not degraded – in fact, it is acknowledged that tradition enables 
the continuity of thought. Similarly, prejudices per se are not questioned, 
merely uncritical ones, such as the Enlightenment prejudice against 
prejudices (cf. Gadamer, 1998:271 ff.). 
In his recent hermeneutical works Habermas opposes the idea of 
neutrality and opts for a normative understanding of his deliberative 
democracy (see Habermas, 1998:349 ff.). Against the long standing 
legacy of natural law – with its inherent discrepancy between “reason” 
and “positive law,” Habermas holds that this “duplication of the concept 
of law” is “sociologically implausible and has normatively awkward 
consequences” (Habermas, 1996:105). 
However, in the context of a fusion of historicistic and hermeneutical 
traditions the nature of universality remains problematic. Grondin (1994: 
10) remarks: 
Neither the Gadamerian claim to universality – which seems to pertain 
to language, historicity, and his own philosophy as well – nor its denial 
by Habermas and Derrida has achieved any final clarity. One might well 
suppose that ‘universality’ refers to the universal validity of some 
proposition. If so, it would be easy to show that hermeneutics is stuck in 
a logical or pragmatic contradiction. Some have tried to construe the 
universal claim of hermeneutics as climaxing in the thesis that every-
thing is historically conditioned, a thesis supposed to be universally 
valid. If this thesis is meant to apply universally, then it must apply to its 
own claim, which must itself be historically limited and therefore not 
universal. The universal claim of hermeneutics is thus considered self-
contradictory. 
Amidst the chaos and relativism of radical postmodernism, the recent 
challenge launched by Sokal and Bricmont caused considerable em-
barrassment within postmodern circles (cf. Sokal & Bricmont, 1999). The 
American journal, Social Text, positively accepted and published their 
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article (Sokal & Bricmont, 1996:217-252) “Transgressing the boundaries: 
Toward a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity” – and only 
afterwards it turned out that these authors aimed at unmasking the 
unsound position of postmodernity. Their critical stance, however, indeed 
did revive some of the older positivistic sentiments regarding neutral 
facts and observation. 
With reference to what has been called Frege’s Bedeutungsrationalismus 
(“meaning-rationalism”) and Millikan’s critique on it, McDowell also dis-
cerns a scientistic stance in contemporary thought, exemplified in the 
conviction that somehow the brain must be spirit (compare the ideas of 
Dennett, 1987; McDowell, 2001:173-174, footnote 36). 
Within the context of contemporary South Africa the above-mentioned 
developments are extremely relevant. In line with the older positivistic 
belief in an objective and neutral natural science an explicit technocratic 
sentiment is present in the direction taken by the higher education 
system of the current government. The assumed neutrality is ingrained to 
such an extent that it surfaces unproblematically in the most recent 
discussions regarding the teaching of religion at school. The policy 
document of the government advances the idea that religious education 
ought to be neutral. The initial policy document did not distinguish 
between state schools and public schools (thus making the school 
actually an extension of the state). Although the subsequent document 
dropped this identification, it still continues the view that since the state is 
(supposedly) neutral, the school ought to be neutral as well. 
In observing the normative standards of public justice the state ought to 
be impartial towards the legal interests integrated within its public order, 
but this impartiality fundamentally differs from neutrality. 
What happens within the sphere of scholarship does not conform to this 
positivistic picture of objectivity and neutrality. Given the full circle – 
running through positivism, historicism, the linguistic turn (including the 
rise and development of hermeneutics, up to the most recent variants of 
a radical relativistic postmodernism) – this article will attempt to focus on 
the untenability of the one pillar of positivism. In line with this focus the 
untenability of the idea of scholarly neutrality in terms of what will be 
explained to be the Achilles’ heel of positivism will be highlighted. This 
delimitation has also been partially motivated by the centenary of Karl 
Popper that sparked off the conference in Chilli where an earlier version 
of this paper was presented. The thread linking the diverse stances 
during the 20th century is the notion of universality. The idea of modal 
universality will turn out to unveil the impasse of positivism and the 
supposed neutrality and objectivity of science. 
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Although Popper is sometimes associated with positivism, he considers 
himself to be a major figure in causing the death of positivism. One of his 
main concerns is the problem of demarcation, given in the question: is it 
possible to elevate the isolated domain of “science” to the level of being 
the sole source of reliable knowledge of reality, or is it rather that even 
science itself is dependent upon assumptions that cannot be “verified” by 
science itself? As it turned out, this question intimately coheres with the 
problem of induction (i.e., the nature of generalizations): is it possible to 
obtain knowledge with a claim to universality merely by investigating a 
limited number of instances? 
The systematic perspective in terms of which the Achilles’ heel of 
positivism will be exposed will at once serve to account for the possibility 
– not only of a multiplicity – of alternative approaches in “science,” since 
in particular it will be made relevant for a critical appraisal of the 
possibility of Christian scholarship. 
2. The limitations of sense experience 
Modern positivism advocates a specific “medium” in service of their 
acclaimed objectivity and neutrality: sense experience. The adherents of 
positivism understood the issue of demarcation in terms of the ideal to 
provide an experiential foundation for reliable scientific knowledge. 
Usually the term empirical is restricted to what is given by the senses. 
Much has been written about this philosophical orientation of positivism. 
The essential element which I want to highlight within this context is the 
emphasis it has laid upon sense experience. Of course one can relate 
this to the age-old epistemological quest to understand the sources of 
knowledge. Traditionally there have been two main candidates: the 
senses and reason (intellect). Sometimes intuition is also introduced: 
either as a part of the former or of the latter, or in some instances as a 
faculty transcending the confines both of sensibility and rationality. 
At first sight observation seems to be a quite innocent candidate if one is 
in search of a reliable basis for human knowledge. Yet, as such ob-
servation (in the context of “sense experience”) does not provide us with 
concepts and descriptive terms – the latter ought to be generated by the 
so-called “knowing subject” and it unfolds in the formulation of 
arguments. The problem is that no single argument can avoid the 
concepts present in the formulated statements or propositions regarding 
what has been observed. Implicitly or explicitly philosophers of science, 
in their attempt to give an account of the status of scientific knowledge, 
therefore had to account for the nature of concept formation. 
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3. Concept formation  
Cassirer points out that it was the concept of number that first of all 
helped us to appreciate the nature and value of concept formation as 
such. Surely, Pythagorean thinking overestimated the role of number by 
claiming that number constitutes the essence of every entity. However, 
by leaving this metaphysical perspective aside we are enabled, accord-
ing to Cassirer, to realize that although number does not constitute the 
essence of things, it does form the foundation for rational knowledge.2 Of 
course this acknowledgement does cause serious problems for an 
account of concepts based upon (sense) experience. The human senses 
are always directed towards different kinds of entities and processes. For 
example, one can observe the different people present at a conference 
and see how they interact in the course of the event. One can even count 
those who are present at the event and assign a number to it, simply 
because those attending the conference individually and collectively 
display quantitative properties. However, in terms of affirming “sense 
experience” as the ultimate source of knowledge the crucial question 
arises: is it possible to come to a sensory observation (perception) of the 
numerical (and other) aspect(s) of the event? But before we explore this 
problem, it may be fruitful to highlight the implicit trust in human reason 
evident in the scientistic legacy. 
4. The “objectivity” of science: “reason” protected from 
faith? 
Within the empiricistic tradition – in modern philosophy initially advocated 
by Locke, Berkeley and Hume, but later on continued by positivism and 
neo-positivism – “sense data” has received a central position. In order to 
understand it, we have to go back and look at the way in which Immanuel 
Kant reacted to the empiricistic stance.  
In the thought of Kant a peculiar relationship between “chaotic sense 
material” and the ordering function of “thought categories” is portrayed. It 
is remarkable to note how influential this orientation of Kant is, for Popper 
(1972:68) still defends it: “Thus Kant was right that it is our intellect which 
imposes its laws – its ideas, its rules – upon the inarticulate mass of our 
‘sensations’ and thereby brings order into them.”  
                                           
2 “Der Anspruch, in der Zahl die Substanz der Dinge zu erfassen, tritt freilich allmählich 
zurück; aber zugleich vertieft und verschärft sich die Einsicht, dass in ihr die Substanz 
der rationalen Erkenntnis wurzelt” (Cassirer, 1910:35). 
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The distinctions introduced by Kant in this regard reflect his own attempt 
to arrive at a demarcation between (natural) science and practical faith. 
His position turned out to be an alternative to the traditional Roman 
Catholic distinction between reason and faith, since its justification for 
this view stems from a different basic motive. Kant wants to provide a 
firm foundation for the preceding ideal of an encompassing natural 
science that is restricted to the domain of sense experience (chaotic 
sensory impressions). Within the super-sensory domain of practical 
freedom, the category of causality does not apply. His famous statement 
is: “Ich mußte also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu 
bekommen” (Kant, 1787, Introduction to the second edition, B:xxx).3 Yet, 
what is concealed in this attempt to separate faith and science is a subtle 
faith in science! 
5. Faith in science 
Positivism and neo-positivism apparently pursued this split between faith 
and science to its ultimate consequences by claiming that “science” is an 
“objective” and “neutral” enterprise.4 With “(sense-) experience” as the 
sole and final judge, the criterion of empirical verification has been 
introduced to disqualify any and all philosophical presuppositions. 
“Science” is supposed to be without any presuppositions whatsoever. By 
the late twenties of the 20th century a circle of thinkers – eventually 
known as the Wiener Kreis (the Vienna Circle) – ridiculed metaphysics, 
while “science” was promoted to be the only reliable guide to life. 
6. The alternative route proposed by Popper 
Hacohen (2002:195) points out that Popper “sought to overcome the gap 
the Wiener Kreis had opened between science and philosophy”. By 
attempting this Popper once again opened the avenue to historical 
perspectives, because there is no single discipline (special science) 
which does not mirror within its own confines the successive trends 
manifested in the history of philosophy. But we have to explore the 
historical background a bit further in order to appreciate what Popper 
achieved. 
                                           
3 Max Müller translates this statement as follows: “I had therefore to remove knowledge, 
in order to make room for belief” (Müller, 1961:512). 
4 Haeckel summarizes this dualistic position by claiming that faith commences where 
science terminates. See the excellent biographical work written by Hemleben (1974). 
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6.1 Kant’s ultimate trust in “reason” 
The position taken by (neo-) positivism certainly was not totally new or 
original. Already Kant was convinced by his British predecessor, David 
Hume, that exact natural laws cannot be grounded in “experience.” After 
all, Kant could not agree with Hume that we obtain all knowledge from 
sensory perception or “experience” alone.5 What impressed Kant part-
icularly is the ability of human beings to produce an intellectual 
formulation of the laws which things in nature obey. As a consequence 
he wanted to explain how such knowledge is possible. 
Kant was particularly impressed by the contribution of Galileo to the 
development of the modern natural sciences. What impressed him was 
that Galileo formulated his law of inertia with the aid of a pure thought-
experiment. In his famous treatise on “two new sciences” (1638) Galileo 
used the following thought-experiment: if a body is put in motion on an 
indefinitely extended path, then this body would continue its motion 
infinitely, i.e. it would not discontinue its motion except if something 
exerts power on it (e.g. gravity or friction).6 
From this law of inertia Kant drew the following conclusion: if it was 
possible for Galileo to formulate a thought experiment out of the 
spontaneous subjectivity of theoretical thought and to deduce a natural 
law from it – the kinematical law of inertia – then this must entail that 
elements of knowledge are previously (a priori) present within the human 
mind, which in the first place makes possible our knowledge of reality. 
Within the development of modern philosophy the theory of knowledge 
(epistemology) has witnessed a remarkable shift from the “object” to the 
“subject”. This shift is known as the “Copernican” revolution in epistemo-
logy and it reinforced the notion of things within nature as “objects”. 
Someone inclined to defend the neutrality of observation normally would 
be willing to accept as the most general observation-term this notion of 
an “object”: all the different things in nature are to be seen as “objects”. 
However, this observation-term in itself displays the tremendous subject-
ivist assumption (prejudice) so deeply impregnated in our Western notion 
of science – as such causing an inability to appraise things in nature as 
                                           
5 Hume (1739) claimed: “To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see, all this is nothing but 
to perceive” (A Treatise of Human Nature, I,2,6). 
6 Galileo thus turned the Aristotelian conception upside down, for according to Aristotle 
something moving is constantly in need of a cause. Galileo realized that movement 
does not need a cause – only a change of movement (for instance acceleration or 
deceleration) requires a cause. 
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genuine subjects, i.e. as being subjected to (God-given) physical laws for 
their existence as material things. 
In so far as physical entities are material they are not objects but 
subjects (subject to physical laws), and in so far as they are objects they 
are considered according to some or other non-physical facet – for 
example as something perceived (sense-object), as something analysed 
(identified and distinguished from something else – logical-analytical 
object), as something bought or sold (economic object), and so on. 
Therefore, although things such as these could be objectified by humans, 
this objectification pre-supposes their primary existence as (physical) 
subjects. Speaking about them in all possible contexts as objects simply 
underscores the powerful subjectivist (human-centred) legacy operative 
in Western thinking. Since material entities indeed only occur within the 
domain of sense experience through the mediation of subjective observ-
ational acts (of objectification), it is understandable why the term “object” 
has acquired such a crucial position. But the question now is: how can 
we move beyond the limitations of a strict positivistic stance? 
6.2 Setting a new scene: transcending (neo-)positivism 
(Neo-) positivism can be described as the philosophical idolization of the 
experimental method on the basis of sensory perception. Neemann aptly 
refers to this conviction with an apology to the biblical saying: in the 
beginning was the Word. “Am Anfang war die Methode.” (“In the 
beginning was the Method” – Newmann, 1986:70.) The central principle 
of the Wiener Kreis, in the twenties and thirties of the 20th century, was 
that of “verification.” 
6.2.1  Wittgenstein and Popper 
Already Ernst Mach claimed – on the grounds of empirical (i.e. sensory) 
perception – that only mathematics and physics are to be allowed within 
in the domain of the sciences. 
This delimitation of science led Wittgenstein, the mathematician-
engineer-philosopher, to the point of view that the limits of my language 
are the limits of my world (Tractatus 5.6.). According to Wittgenstein the 
task of philosophy is to delimit the controversial terrain of the natural 
sciences (= physics) (4.113) – and the totality of the natural sciences 
constitutes the totality of true propositions (4.11). That which transcends 
the propositions of physics (which is meaningful) and logic (the 
propositions of which are tautologies and therefore meaningless: 4.461) 
cannot be known or lingually expressed – it belongs to the sphere of 
nonsense (Unsinn). The objection that the Tractatus itself would be a 
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victim of such a delimitation of science (to logic and natural science) is 
obviated by Wittgenstein’s comment that his propositions serve an 
illuminating end: 
[A]nyone who understands me eventually recognizes them 
[propositions] as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to 
climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder 
after he has climbed up it) (6.54)! 
Karl Popper reacted strongly against this attempt at delimitation by 
Wittgenstein. He investigates, for instance, the following sentence by 
Wittgenstein: “Philosophy is no theory, but an activity” (4.112). This 
sentence clearly does not belong to the totality of natural scientific 
propositions, and therefore also not to the totality of true propositions. On 
the other hand, it is not a false proposition either, since if it were, then its 
negation would have to be true and therefore it would belong to the 
natural sciences. The only possibility then would be the mentioned 
conclusion of Wittgenstein (6.54): the sentence is nonsensical. Although 
Wittgenstein admits with this statement that the Tractatus is nonsensical, 
he declares in the final paragraph of the Preface that the truth of his 
notions appear to him unassailable and definitive. He is even of the 
opinion that he has found the final solution to the problems on all cardinal 
points. In a radical fashion Popper (1966) responds that this view shows 
that we can communicate “unassailably and definitely true thoughts” by 
way of propositions which are admittedly “nonsensical,” and that we can 
solve problems “finally by propounding nonsense”. 
The implication is that all the metaphysical nonsense against which 
Bacon, Hume, Kant and Russell had fought for centuries may now 
“comfortably settle down, and even frankly admit that it is nonsense” for 
we now have a new kind of nonsense at our disposal: “nonsense that 
communicates thoughts whose truth is unassailable and definitive; in 
other words, deeply significant nonsense” (cf. Popper, 1966-II:297). 
Popper asks himself how one can oppose this position of Wittgenstein. 
Every possible objection against it, after all, is philosophical in nature and 
therefore nonsense. This objection simply constitutes a fortified dogma-
tism.7 
                                           
7 “All that is required, is to delimit the concept sense (or: meaning) in an appropriately 
narrow way so as to rid oneself of all awkward questions simply by saying that one 
does not find them meaningful. Every reasoned objection to this conception of 
meaning is simply rejected as nonsensical: Once enthroned, the dogma of meaning is 
for ever raised above the possibility of attack. It is unassailable and definitive” 
(Popper, 1966-II:297). 
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This meaning-conception of Wittgenstein, with its included delimitation of 
science, is just as untenable as the “verification principle” of neo-
positivism. The term “logical positivism” (or logical empiricism) was 
brought into being to refer to a group of philosophers, logicians and 
mathematicians who became known in Vienna as der Wiener Kreis. The 
movement originally centred in Moritz Schlick, with philosophically 
oriented members such as Carnap, Neurath, Feigl, Waismann, Zilsel and 
Kraft, as well as natural scientific and mathematically oriented members 
like Frank, Menger, Gödel and Hahn. Carnap, Neurath and Hahn in 1929 
published a manifesto entitled “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, Der 
Wiener Kreis”. In this circle Wittgenstein’s Tractatus was also discussed 
and from it (cf. 4.024) they borrowed their famous verification principle: 
the meaning of a statement lies in the manner by which it is verified. 
In his publication, Language, truth and logic (1936), A.J. Ayer explains 
that factual assertions are subject to the following criterion of verification: 
a sentence is meaningful for any specific person if and only if that person 
knows which perceptions would lead him (under certain conditions) to 
accept the proposition as true or to reject them as false (Ayer, 1967:35). 
A closer analysis causes Ayer to distinguish between a strong and a 
weak sense of verification. A proposition is verifiable in the first sense, if 
and only if the truth thereof can be conclusively determined in ex-
perience. A proposition is verifiable in the latter sense if it is possible to 
render the experience probable (Ayer, 1967:36-38). Ayer fully realizes 
that general formulations of laws cannot be conclusively verified – in 
consequence he has to accept verification in the weak sense. In a later 
preface (1946) he is nonetheless of the opinion that a class of empirical 
propositions exists that are conclusively verifiable. These are the basic 
propositions, which exclusively refer to the content of a single ex-
perience, and which can be identified as unique. Ayer is convinced that 
he has eliminated all metaphysics by means of this verification-criterion. 
The newer theory of science of the past 40 years has realized, due to the 
influence of Popper, Toulmin, Polanyi (originally a chemist) and es-
pecially Thomas Kuhn (physicist) that even physics is inevitably gripped 
by a theoretical picture of reality (paradigm) and that it is possible to 
speak meaningfully of an ultimate commitment in every scientific activity 
– a central conviction out of which the scientist accounts for the deepest 
fundamental questions of doing science. This realization came about 
partly because of the non-verifiability of the (neo-positivist) verification 
principle. 
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6.2.2  Popper’s “critical rationalism” 
As an alternative to (neo-) positivism Popper defends a critical 
rationalism. Popper explains that the choice he had to make does not 
concern “simply an intellectual affair” because it is “a moral decision” 
(Popper, 1966-II: 232). If only that which can be defended by “means of 
argument or experience” is considered to be “acceptable”, then we have 
an uncritical or comprehensive rationalism. This boils down to “the 
principle that any assumption which cannot be supported either by 
argument or by experience is to be discarded” (Popper, 1966-II:230). 
According to Popper this kind of rationalism is demonstrably inconsistent: 
Now it is easy to see that this principle of an uncritical rationalism is 
inconsistent for since it cannot, in its turn, be supported by argument or 
by experience, it implies that it should itself be discarded. (It is analogous 
to the paradox of the liar, i.e. to a sentence which asserts its own falsity.) 
Uncritical rationalism is therefore logically untenable; and since a purely 
logical argument can show this, uncritical rationalism can be defeated by 
its own chosen weapon, argument (Popper, 1966-II:230). 
Popper proceeds by generalizing this criticism. He says that since “all 
argument must proceed from assumptions, it is plainly impossible to 
demand that all assumptions should be based on argument” (Popper, 
1966-II:230). He explicitly rejects the demand raised by many philosoph-
ers, namely that we should start without any assumptions whatsoever. 
In anticipation of Gadamer’s mentioned criticism of Enlightenment, 
manifested in its prejudice against prejudice,8 Popper indicates that the 
“assumption” behind the rejection of all assumptions should be recog-
nized: 
For they themselves rest upon the truly colossal assumption that it is 
possible to start without, or with only a few assumptions, and still to 
obtain results that are worth while. (Indeed, this principle of avoiding all 
presuppositions is not, as some may think, a counsel of perfection, but 
a form of the paradox of the liar) (Popper, 1966-II:230). 
                                           
8 “The overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the Enlightenment, will itself 
prove to be a prejudice, and removing it opens the way to an appropriate 
understanding of the finitude which dominates not only our humanity but also our 
historical consciousness” (Gadamer, 1998:276). 
The Achilles’ heel of positivism  
268 Koers 68(2 & 3) 2003:255-278 
Since neither logical argument nor experience can establish the 
rationalist attitude, Popper opts for a different stance: that of critical 
rationalism. He first of all points out that 
whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has 
adopted, consciously or unconsciously, some proposal, or decision, or 
belief, or behaviour; an adoption which may be called ‘irrational’. 
Whether this adoption is tentative or leads to a settled habit, we may 
describe it as an irrational faith in reason. So rationalism is necessarily 
far from comprehensive or self-contained. This has frequently been 
overlooked by rationalists who thus exposed themselves to a beating in 
their own field and by their own favourite weapon whenever an 
irrationalist took the trouble to turn it against them. And indeed it did not 
escape the attention of some enemies of rationalism that one can 
always refuse to accept arguments, either all arguments or those of a 
certain kind; and that such an attitude can be carried through without 
becoming logically inconsistent. This led them to see that the uncritical 
rationalist who believes that rationalism is self-contained and can be 
established by argument must be wrong. Irrationalism is logically 
superior to uncritical rationalism (Popper, 1966-II:231). 
This view of Popper indeed resounds not only in the thinking of 
Gadamer, but also in the works of another prominent philosopher of 
science, Wolfgang Stegmüller. In reaction to the mentioned attempt of 
Kant to remove science in order to make room for belief, Stegmüller 
(1969b:33) says: 
One does not have to restrict knowledge in order to make room for faith. 
Much rather one already has to believe in something to be able to 
speak about knowing and science at all.9 
This insight should be connected to the nature of evidence. Stegmüller 
argues that one can believe in evidence or that one cannot believe in it, 
but this belief or unbelief is not capable of acquiring a more basic 
foundation. It is a primordial decision preceding all rationality. It has to be 
taken in every single case where something has to be known.10 
Similarly, in harmony with Popper’s acknowledgement that the con-
fidence in the rationality of human thinking in itself is not rational, 
                                           
9 “Man muss nicht das Wissen beseitigen, um den Glauben Platz zu machen. Vielmehr 
muss mann bereits etwas glauben, um überhaupt von Wissen und Wissenschaft 
reden zu können” (Stegmüller, 1969b:33). 
10 “An Einsicht kann man glauben oder nicht glauben, mann kann diesen Glauben oder 
Unglauben aber nicht weiter begründen, ... Es ist eine ‘vorrationale Urentscheidung’, 
die hier getroffen werden muss, und zwar in jeden einzelnen Falle, wo etwas 
anerkannt werden soll” (Stegmüller, 1969b:169). 
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Stegmüller (1969b:212) points out that within no single domain of 
knowing thinking can claim that it is self-assured: 
somewhere an ultimate knowing must be given; without that we could 
not even start11 ... We should already ‘dispose of’ an absolute evi-
dence, i.e. we have to believe in it in advance,12 ... in science believing 
is found, in religion one knows (or: pretends to know).13 
This enlarged approach created room for the conviction that the range of 
science should not be narrowly reduced to (the methods of) mathe-
matics, physics and logic (as the ideal of modern natural science claims) 
– it indeed encompasses all reality. A critical question at this point is: is it 
possible to make the transition from individual instances without 
confidence in the reality of universality? From what we have argued in an 
earlier context it is clear that universality indeed poses a serious problem 
for “empirical observation”. This leads us to the heart of positivism. 
7. Uncovering the Achilles’ heel of positivism 
Popper discusses universality first of all with reference to what he calls 
strict and numerical universality (Popper, 1968:62 ff.). It is clear to 
Popper that the universality of natural laws precludes any attempt to 
ascertain empirically every single event to which the law might apply: 
For the verification of a natural law could only be carried out by 
empirically ascertaining every single event to which the law might apply, 
and by finding that every such event actually conforms to the law – 
clearly an impossible task (Popper, 1968:63). 
The other side of the coin is that Popper does not consider it to be 
meaningful to establish a direct confrontation between statements and 
observations. He realizes that human observation is already intertwined 
with conceptual elements. 
The psychologist bias poses the question “how could we ever reach any 
knowledge of facts if not through sense-perception?” (Popper, 1968:94). 
Whatever we know about the “world of facts must therefore be ex-
                                           
11 “Irgendein absolutes Wissen muß es geben; ohne dieses könnten wir überhaupt nicht 
beginnen” (Stegmüller, 1969b:194). 
12 “Absolute Evidenz müssen wir schon ‘haben’, d.h. wir müssen an sie bereits glauben, 
...” (Stegmüller, 1969b:194). 
13 “... in der Wissenschaft wird geglaubt, in der Religion weiss man (oder: behauptet 
man, zu wissen)” (Stegmüller, 1969b:212). 
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pressible in the form of statements about our experiences” (Popper, 
1968:94). Popper then argues that this doctrine “founders” in his “opinion 
on the problems of induction and of universals” (Popper, 1968:94). 
It is noteworthy that Bernays (1974:601) introduces the conviction that 
the “proper characteristic of rationality” is “to be found in the conceptual 
element”. On this basis he supports Popper in the latter’s emphasis on 
the presence of conceptual elements in observation: 
All empirical investigations of nature are based on this fundamental 
stock of concepts contained in our background knowledge. Popper has 
repeatedly stressed the circumstance that the statements which we 
ordinarily regard as simply observational already presuppose this con-
ceptual basis, so that in a proper sense we cannot say that natural 
science starts from observations (Bernays, 1974:602). 
Unfortunately, in his subsequent discussion of universality, Popper does 
not distinguish between the universality of (functional) properties and the 
universal structural features of entities. This distinction is particularly 
useful when it comes to a criticism of the conceptual untenability of 
positivism. 
Let us explore this issue in some more detail. In order to highlight the 
limitations of the senses in the acquisition of knowledge, we consider the 
concept of matter in terms of some of its main conceptual transform-
ations. 
We have referred to the fact that the Pythagoreans adhered to one 
statement above all else: everything is number. After the discovery of 
irrational numbers – revealing within the seemingly form-giving and 
delimiting function of number something formless – Greek mathematics 
as a whole was transformed into a spatial mode (the geometrization after 
the initial arithmetization). As a consequence material entities were no 
longer described purely in arithmetical terms. The aspect of space then 
provided the necessary terms required to characterize material entities. 
This spatial angle of approach remained in force until the rise of modern 
philosophy, since philosophers like Descartes (1596-1650) and Kant 
(1724-1804) still saw the “essence” of material things in their extension. 
Particularly through the work done by Galileo and Newton the main 
tendency of classical physics eventually underwent a shift in perspective 
by attempting to describe all physical phenomena exclusively in terms of 
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(kinematical) motion.14 Writing about the foundations of physics, David 
Hilbert refers to the mechanistic ideal of unity in physics but immediately 
adds the remark that we now finally have to free us from this untenable 
ideal (cf. Hilbert, 1970:258).15 
Since the introduction of the atom theory of Niels Bohr in 1913, and 
actually already since the discovery of radio-activity in 1896 and the 
discovery of the energy quantum h,16 modern physics has realized that 
matter is indeed characterized by physical energy operation – the 
physical aspect of reality must therefore be seen as the qualifying 
function of matter, stamping physical entities in their energy-operation. 
This brief sketch of the genesis and growth of the concept of matter 
illustrates in which way different (modal/aspectual) property-terms served 
to characterize matter – starting with the perspective of number and then 
proceeding to the aspect of space, the kinematical aspect and eventually 
the physical aspect of reality. 
What is important to realize is that the description of matter was 
decisively dependent upon a particular theoretical view of reality (Kuhn 
would have used the expression paradigm or disciplinary matrix) that is 
entailed in the preference which is assigned to specific property-terms.  
The crucial question now is: Is it possible to account for this foundational 
choice in an empirical way? In other words: 
• Is it possible to perceive the numerical aspect? 
• Can we weigh the spatial aspect? 
• Can we determine the volume of the kinematical aspect? 
• Can we “measure” the “distance” between the spatial aspect and the 
physical aspect? 
                                           
14 The British philosopher, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), was familiar with the mechan-
ics of Galileo enabling him – as opposed to Descartes – to employ the basic concept, 
moving body, as a descriptive tool. 
15 It is therefore strange that the contemporary physical scientist from Cambridge, 
Stephen Hawking, still writes: “The eventual goal of science is to provide a single 
theory that describes the whole universe” (Hawking, 1988:10). 
16 In order to account for the discrete nature of the omission or absorption of energy, 
Planck postulated that radiant energy is quantized, proportional to the frequency v in 
the formula E = hnv – where n is an integer, v the frequency, and h the quantum of 
action (Wirkungsquantum) with the value 6.624 x 10-34. 
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The obvious absurdity of these questions not only illustrates the 
unsoundness of the positivistic faith in facts, but at once points at a 
crucial distinction implicitly operative throughout the history of the special 
sciences, namely the distinction between aspects and entities. These 
aspects enable our scholarly reflection to discern a universal coherence 
between different kinds of entities – just think about the (unspecified) 
universal scope of the fundamental laws of thermodynamics (which hold 
for all possible physical entities). In general at this level an implicit choice 
regarding particular modes of explanation causes a theoretical di-
vergence among special scientists. The question concerning the relation-
ship and coherence among the different aspects of reality (in terms of 
which we can describe anything) simply cannot be settled with the aid of 
the positivistic method of (empirical) perception and verification. 
Nonetheless, positivism did realize that one can only discover the 
structural nature of an entity and the laws holding for physical entities by 
investigating the lawfulness (law-conformity) they evince. But it is 
precisely the difference between the universality of a law and the unique 
instances that can be empirically tested in experimental settings that 
once again unveils the mistaken nature of a positivistic position. A limited 
number of experimental instances could never warrant the claim of 
universality contained in law statements. 
In its materialistic variant positivism reveals even further inconsistencies. 
Let us look at the typical claim that matter is all there is: atoms, mole-
cules, and macro-molecules in interaction. This statement claims that 
there is nothing beyond matter – but what about the statement making 
this claim? Is it true? If so, then there is something immaterial (truth). 
Then what about those natural laws which hold for material things? They 
condition being material but are not themselves material. Thus, both with 
respect to the truth-value and the universal validity of natural laws, the 
basic claim of positivistic materialism is self-defeating. 
Popper did not know this distinction between modal and typical laws. 
Making this distinction entails the acknowledgement that differently 
structured entities all function within universal modal aspects of reality 
(either as subjects or as objects). Therefore, whereas modal laws are 
given for all kinds of subjects, typical entitary laws are only given for a 
limited class of subjects. Typical laws always specify (but never: 
individualize) the universal modal laws – for example, thermodynamics, 
as a purely modal physical theory, abstracts from the typical differences 
between the solid state, the fluid state, and the gaseous state. 
Discussing the nature of an a priori synthetic element in the “empirical 
sciences”, Stegmüller (1969a: 316) raised the following possibility: 
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Surely, this cannot imply that the totality of law-statements present in a 
natural science could be of an a priori nature. Much rather, such an 
apriorism should limit itself to the construction of a limited number of a 
priori valid law relationships, while, furthermore, all more specific laws 
of nature should be dependent on empirical testing. 
In fact this distinction is already present in the thought of Kant, who 
distinguished between his (supposedly universally valid a priori) thought 
categories on the one hand, and so-called empirical laws of nature on 
the other hand (Kant, 1783 par. 36:320). 
Keeping in mind that we must distinguish laws in an ontical sense from 
our hypothetical law statements in scientific formulations, it is still re-
markable to note the similarity between the just-mentioned statement of 
Stegmüller and the following explanation of Stafleu (related to the dist-
inction between modal laws and typical laws): 
Whereas typical laws can usually be found by induction and 
generalization of empirical facts or lower level law statements, modal 
laws are found by abstraction. Euclidean geometry, Galileo’s discovery 
of the laws of motion …, and thermodynamic laws are all examples of 
laws found by abstraction. This state of affairs is reflected in the use of 
the term ‘rational mechanics’, in distinction from experimental physics 
(Stafleu, 1980:11). 
Whereas Kant ought to receive credit for having wrestled with the 
dimension of modal universality – in his search for the synthetic a priori 
(cf. Strauss, 2000) – positivism and neo-positivism ought to be acknow-
ledged for their emphasis on experimental testing (not the same as 
verification). Only through studying the orderliness or law-conformity of 
entities is it possible to arrive at an understanding of the type laws 
holding for that limited class of entities conforming to their peculiar type 
laws. In the case of physics it requires empirical research through 
experimentation. Of course this do not free physics from an overarching 
and underlying paradigm (theoretical perspective) in which modal pro-
perties are also accounted for. Sometimes this dimension of theory 
formation is implicitly acknowledged when reference is made to theo-
retical terms which cannot directly be tested against actual experiences. 
8. The Achilles’ heel of positivism and the possibility of 
Christian scholarship 
The inevitability of employing modal functional concepts underscores the 
necessity of a theoretical view of reality. Such a view can either accept 
the radical diversity within reality – evinced in the irreducibility of the 
various modal aspects – or it can attempt to elevate one or more than 
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one mode(s) of explanation to a level where a single mode or a 
combination of a few modes may serve as a explanatory device for 
whatever there is. Attempts such as these ultimately proceed from a 
misdirected trust in human reason, supposedly capable of finding a point 
of rest within the creational diversity. All the -isms within the various 
academic disciplines witness the negative effects of such an attempt to 
explain reality from within. 
In spite of the contrary – owing to the uninformed prejudices against the 
possibility of Christian scholarship – claimed by those who oppose the 
idea of a Christian view within the special sciences, the Christian 
starting-point actually liberates the scholar from the one-sided and 
distorting effects of divinizing aspects of reality. At the same time the 
elementary biblical insight that one should not view anything (or any 
aspect of creation) as divine, helps us to understand why science in all 
its subdivisions can never be neutral with respect to the issue about the 
ultimate origin and final destination of reality. 
The educational policy of the state should therefore never fall prey to 
positivistic faith in a supposedly objective and neutral science – and that 
for the following reasons: 
• The current practice and the history of every singly discipline, to a 
smaller or larger degree, exemplifies alternative theoretical stances 
(mathematics not excluded). 
• The theoretical divergence within the special sciences is a direct 
consequence of the unavoidability of (implicitly or explicitly) proceed-
ing from a particular theoretical view of reality. 
• In order to be impartial, the state should not superimpose upon 
education in South Africa the distorted perspective of one theoretical 
orientation, namely that of positivism. It must rather attempt to protect 
the constitutional rights of particular “conviction communities,” such as 
primary, secondary and tertiary educational and scientific institutions. 
While we have learned from positivism that there is no substitute for 
“empirical investigation” when it comes to a discernment of the structural 
laws and principles of (natural and social) entities, and while post-
modernism has opened our eyes for false certainties and for an 
acknowledgement of the provisional nature of human knowledge, a 
biblical starting-point enables us to understand (natural and social) 
entities within the matrix of God-given laws. Furthermore, a biblical point 
of departure deepens the postmodern claim concerning the fallibility of 
human endeavours with an appeal to the liberating power of redemption 
in Christ. In principle this starting-point safe-guards a scholar from one-
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sidedly absolutizing facets of created reality, without suggesting in any 
way that scholarly knowledge could be elevated to our last certainty in 
life, for that would simply mean that once again we have surrendered to 
an idolatrous trust in reason. 
9. Stegmüller and the problem of modal universality 
Before we conclude our discussion a few remarks about Stegmüller’s 
position in respect of modal universality is needed. The way in which 
Stegmüller transformed Kuhn’s thought on the basis of Sneed’s theory of 
mathematical physics, comes much closer to an actual acknowledge-
ment of modal universality. According to him, what would appear to be 
unique and unprecedented in Kuhn’s work, 
is the fact that he appears to impute irrational behavior to the 
practitioners of the exact natural sciences (of all people!). And indeed 
he appears to impute it to both of the forms of the scientific practice 
distinguished by him. Anyone engaged in normal science is a narrow-
minded dogmatist clinging uncritically to his theory. Those engaged in 
extraordinary research leading to scientific revolutions are religious 
fanatics under the spell of conversion, trying by all means of persuasion 
and propaganda to convert others to the new paradigm as revealed to 
themselves (Stegmüller, 1976:vii). 
Not only do the natural scientists work in an irrational manner – 
according to the critics of Kuhn it would appear as if he is also a 
proponent of the non-inductive nature of the natural sciences. 
A comparison between four prominent figures provides the following 
picture: 
• Hume: the natural sciences proceed inductively and non-rationally; 
• Carnap: the natural sciences proceed inductively and rationally; 
• Popper: the natural sciences proceed non-inductively and rationally; 
• Kuhn: the natural sciences proceed non-inductively and non-rationally; 
(cf. Stegmüller, 1975:487-490). 
Though it will take us too far to explore in more detail the way in which 
Stegmüller accounts for a threefold immunity of theories against possible 
falsifications, it will be sufficient to say that what he called the structural 
nucleus of a theory, which remains untouched when hypothetical 
extensions of it are challenged with falsification, operates on the level of 
modal universality. Only those scientists who succeed in erecting new 
structural nuclei are involved in extraordinary research. Normal scientists 
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merely explore the structural nucleus of a theory by working on hypo-
thetical extensions of it. 
It turns out that Popper is mainly focused on abnormal science, whereas 
Stegmüller is of the opinion that the processes of rigorous testing and 
confirmation or falsification actually typically belong to normal science. If 
the normal scientist is subjected to a norm constantly requiring an 
involvement in the change of the structural nucleus of theories, it would 
entail an inhuman challenge to the average scientist – something like: 
“Become a Newton or an Einstein!” He remarks: 
In so far as this maxim is directed towards ‘’normal scientists’, who are 
in their domain of work constantly involved in sober and productive 
labour and who are also by far the majority of scientists, it is gruesome 
and inhuman. It implies that the assessment of every scholarly 
competence is made dependent upon the extent to which it conforms to 
this demand and that with it a devastating value-judgment is passed 
upon practically all scientists (Stegmüller, 1980:52). 
10. Concluding remark 
On the basis of a brief and incomplete sketch of the intellectual 
landscape of the 20th century – spanned between positivism and 
postmodernity – we have restricted ourselves to an exposition and 
critique of the Achilles’ heel of positivism. Popper, who accepted a plea 
of being guilty to the accusation that he “killed” positivism (1974-I:69 ff.), 
indeed could have deepened his criticism of positivism if he was in a 
position to consider the distinction between the modal and structural 
dimensions or reality. His considerations with regard to universality and 
the problem of induction would have been much stronger had he been 
able to consider the implications of what we have called modal 
universality. 
In conclusion we have highlighted the relevance of these considerations 
both for the South African context and for an understanding of the nature 
and task of Christian scholarship. Given the technocratic, scientistic 
undertones surfacing within the educational policies of the South African 
government, policy-makers may benefit from critically questioning the 
(positivistic) assumptions regarding the supposed objectivity and 
neutrality of scholarly activities. 
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